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-In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF
GREATER SALT LAKE, a corporation,
ROBERT PEAY and DON DEAN, d/b/a
DEAN & PEAY CONSTRUCTION; C&T
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a partnership; DUANE HERBERT, d/b/a CROWN
CONSTRUCTION C 0 MP ANY; J. S.
BRADY DIRKER, d/b/a J. S. BRADY
DIRKER CO.; CLYDE LUNCEFORD;
QUINTIN ELDER and L. G. SPARKS,
d/b/a L. G. SPARKS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, for themselves and others·
similarly situated, and VILLA MARIA, a
partnership,

Case No.

12819

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation of
the State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.

Reply Brief of Appellant, Villa Maria
Appeal from the judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District for Utah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable :Maurice Harding, Judge, Presiding.
Appellant, Villa .Maria, concurs with and joins in
the brief, statement of facts, arguments and authorities
cited by the other appellants in this case, but wishes
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to file its own Reply Brief citing authorities and arguments which Villa :l\Iaria feels entitles it to judgment
m this case. Appellants contend that the establishment
of a mandatory sewer connecting charge by Provo City
for new dwelling units is ultra vires, discriminatory,
and unconstitutional.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
SE,VER CONNECTION CHARGES l\1AY NOT
BE EXACTED FROl\I A SINGLE CLASS OF
THE POPULATION TO DEFRAY GENERAL
GOYERNl\IENTAL EXPENSES '"HI CH
snou·LD IlE BORNE u y THE ENTIRE
COl\Il\IUNITY EQUALLY.
As long ago as 1900, the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that:
"One class of citizens cannot thus be compelled to bear the burdens of government, to
the advantage of all other classes." Cache
Counf.1J 'V ••Tcnscn, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 303,
308. ( 1900) .

The sewer connection charges which are being exacted under Provo City Ordinances 23.20.040 to
23.20.070 are presently being used to defray such general governmental expenses as the payment of new collector trunk lines, replacement of existing sewer lines,
enlargement of the sewage treatment plant~ the retire-
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ment of bond indebtedness, and general operating expenses of the sewer system, including employees'
salaries and equipment expense. Appellants' brief correctly points out that these governmental functions are
for the benefit of all of the people of Provo and should
be paid for by all the people equally. The cases cited in
appellants' brief have so held and need not be repeated
here. Respondent's brief cites Associated FI omcbuilders
v. The City of Livermore, 17 Cal. Rptr. 5, 366 P.2d
448 ( 1961), as being controlling. The case is distinguishable, however, since our ordinance is a revenue measure
rather than a police power enactment and since defendant, Provo City, is without statutory or constitutional authority to enact such an ordinance under its
taxing powers.
The Provo City ordinances are silent as to just
where the money from this se,ver connection fee goes.
Appellants contend it could just as easily go to a general fund and be used for any purpose, as it could to
said Sewer Disposal Operating Fund. A future Provo
City administration could easily earmark such funds
for parks, recreation, streets and roads, etc. Since the
Provo City ordinance is completely silent as to the purpose of the sewer connecting fees, it seems clear that
the funds could go to meet the general obligations of
the municipality. The following citations lend support
to appellants' contention:
"Taxes and license fees and other revenue
collected by a city are primarily for the pur-
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pose of paying the general expenses of operation of the city goYernment and constitute primarily what is designated as a general fund,
unless otherwise provided by ordinance or
statute." 56 Am.Jur.2d 634, § 582. See also
JJlar v. Southern California Gm~ Co., 198 Cal
278 245 Pac. 178 ( 1926), and Pure Jllilk Producers & Distribntors Assn. v. JJloreton, 125
S,V.2<l 216, 27() Ky 736 ( 1939).
The :Montana Supreme Court, in State v. Bailey, 44
P .2d 7 40, 7 41 ( 1935), has also held that:
"Fnmls in custody of municipal functionary
and subject to disbursement for Yarious purposes at municipal officials discretion are general assets of the municipality, as in the case
of cities' general fund which may be used to
meet the demand for payment on account of
boncls issued by special improvement districts
of the city."
Likewise the Kentucky Supreme Court has expressly
ruled that:

and license fees and other revenue
collected by the city are primarily for the purpose of paying general expense."! of operation
and constitute primaril;l} the 'general fund'
unless otherwi.Ye provided by ordinance or
statute." Pure ]}Jilk Producers and Distribu"'1.~axes
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tors Association v. JI orcton, 276 Ky. 736, 125
S,V.2<l 216 ( 1!)39). (Emphasis a<lded.)
Thus, where ordinances are silent as to the purpose
for sai<l fees exacted by the municipalities, such funds
can be earmarked for the general fund for general revenue purposes regardless of what they are presently
appliecl to. Provo City officials are under no statutory
obligation to continue applying these sewer connecting
charges to the sewer disposal operating fun<l which they
have set up. Their minds could change as a need arises
or upon any moment.
Furthermore, this sewer disposal operating fund
is presently being used to defray such general governmental expenses as the payment of new collector trunk
lines, replacement of existing sewer lines, enlargement
of the sewer treatment plant, retirement of the bond indebtedness, and general operating expenses of the sewer
system including employees' salaries and equipment
expense, all of which are general expenses which are
for the benefit of all of the people of Provo and should
he borne by the entire community equally; thus, the
ordinance in question violates the Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Sections 2 and 7, and United States Constitution, Amendment 14.
Appellant, Villa :Maria, cites as its chief authority

the TVeber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy
City case, 26 Utah2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971). In
this case Roy City increased its building permit fee from
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$12.00 to $112.00 per unit for the purpose of obtaining

money for their general fund, to improve the city's
water and sewer systems, which was needed because of
increased construction and the influx of new residents
into the city. The Utah Supreme Court held that the increase placed a disproportionate and unfair burden on
the new home owners as compared to the old ones in the
maintenance of city gm'ernment and that, therefore, the
city ordinance was discriminatory and constitionally impermissable.
The Provo City case we are concerned with here is
almost identical to the Hoy City case pre\'iously mentioned. "That Provo City has done is establish a one-time
tax rather than a connecting fee. The admitted purpose of the ordinance was not to bring the fee in line
with the cost of hooking a pri,-ate line to the municipal
sewer line, but the purpose, on the contrary, was to finance the development, the expansion and the rebuilding
of the entire sewer system. This establishes the connectf ee as a one-time tax and clearly outside the powers .of
the municipality under state law. See 11/cQuillin on
llluniolpal Corporations, Volume 9, § 26.15. Quoting
from l\IcQuillin:
"There is a well understood distinction between a license fee imposed under the police
power for the purpose of regulation and a tax
imposed under the taxing power for revenue.
A license fee or tax under the police power is
such a fee only as will legitirnately assi,st in
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regulation and 'H)ill uot exceed the necessary or
probable m:pense of isswing the license and of
inspecting and regulating the business or other
subject that it covers, consequently, municipal
police power to license as a mode of regulation
is distinguished from municipal power to license for revenue. On the one hand a ta,v that
is not in any unse regulatory and is imposed
e.-r prcssly for general revenue purposes is
based upon the taxing power and even though
a license f cc, it i.~ in truth a tax and not a regulatory exaction under the pol.5ce power. On the
other hand, charges to cover the cost of regulation of a business or occupation and not to
raise revenue are license fees an<l not taxes for
revenue. A revenue ta,v malJ not be imposed
under the guise of police regulation or licensing." l\Ic(~uillin, Pages 31 and 32, Vol. 9.
(Emphasis added.)
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Roy City case,
correctly points out that it is not always easy to tell
'rhether an ordinance is for the purpose of providing
revenue or whether it is really a license fee under the
police powers given to the city. In the Roy City case
the Court says that it is to be recognized that "there
are situations where the ordinance is neither completely
fish or fowl as coming within either of the above mentioned classifications, but it s a hybrid that partakes of
both." (Page 867).
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l\kQuillin sheds further light on this subject as
to how to distinguish between the various factors bearing on whether certain ordinances exact a licensing fee
for regulation or a tax for reYenue purposes. Quoting
from Page 3:3 of the previously cited volume:
"Various factors bear on the matter whether a
particular exaction is a licensing fee for regulation or a tax for re\'etme. In general the
nature and purpose of an ordinance imposing
an exaction and the nature and purpose of the
charter provision or statute authorizing the
ordinance will determine the character of an
exaction in this respect. Thus a declared or
obvious purpose to regulate, though not controlling or conclusive, tends to establish an
exaction as purely regulatory licensing fee.
Uut an ordinance having no provisions for regulation and im posin~ an exaction as a ta.x ordinance designed to raise revenue, especially
when the procced.<t of the licensing fee are
placed in the general revenue fund or account.
TV hen hvied for revenue alone, license fees or
charges are revenue taxes and can be upheld
onl.IJ if based upon the power of tfiJ:ation."
The Provo City charges go into a general sewer
fund which includes the retirement of general obligation bonds and since the ordinance is silent as to purpose, the funds could easily be transferred to a general
fund by a future administration. As appellants' brief
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points out, the ordinance, Provo City Ordinance No.
248, is silent as to its purpose. The money collected from
the ordinance tax goes to pay for monthly sewer service fees, enlargement and replacement of the sewer
collecting system, treatment plant improvements, and
a whole myriad of items connected with the sewer
disposal. In addition, there is no requirement that the
money collected from this fee could not go into the
general fund. The money could just as easily be used
for streets and roads, for development of municipal
parks, etc., imposing an unfair burden upon the class
of people paying the tax. Respondent's brief admits
that the purpose of the ordinance was not to bring the
fee for connecting to the sewer line in line with the expenses involYed, but on the contrary, the purpose was
to raise revenue to finance improvements in the sewer
system to satisfy the needs of new residents in the community. (See page 3 of Respondent's brief.) This
makes the charge under this ordinance a tax and appelland contends that this lies outside the powers of the
mnnici pal corporation. (See also Point II.)
The city has made no claim that a major purpose
of the so-called connecting fee was to bring the fee into
line with the costs of connecting to the sewer line and
inspection, or other regulation, but the city does admit
that the collection of this additional fee is necessary
to improve its sewer system because of the construction
of new dwellings and the growth of the city.
Quoting again from the Roy City case:
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"The critical question here is whether the
ordinance in its practical operation results in
an unjust discrimination by imposing a greater
burden of the cost of city government on one
class of persons as compared to another without any proper basis for such di ffercntiation
and classification. It is not to be doubted
that each new resident has its effect in increasing the cost of city government, nor that due
to the steaclily increasing cost of everything,
including those invoked in rendering such
senices, the city would have authority to raise
the fees charged for such services from time to
time, nevertheless, in that co1111ection the new
residents arc entitled to be treated cquall,11 and
on the same basis as the old residents." 487
P .2d 866 at 868. (Emphasis added.)
Expressing a similar principle is the case of Daniels
v. Burrough of Point Pfra.rnnt, 23 N .J. 357, 129 At.2d
265 ( 195!1). In the Burrough of Point Pleasant case
the New Jersey court struck down the same kind of
ordinance involved in the Roy City case. The court said:
"\\That the Uurrough of Point Pleasant is attempting to do here is to defray the general
cost of government under the guise of reimbursement for the special services required by
the regulation and control of new buildings.
The philosophy of this ordinance is that the
tax rate of the Burrough should remain the
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same and the new people coming into the municipality should hear the burden of the increased
cost of their presence. This is so totally contrary to tax philosophy as to require it tobe
.~tricken down."
f"leRReJf,

v. Cit;ij of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d
144, 355 l\lich. 575, cited in appellants' brief.

See also

~16f'1'eU

Under the undisputed facts as presented here, the
establishment of a $100.00 connecting fee, which admitteclly had no relationship to increased cost of the
services rendered, and more importantly, where the declared purpose was to raise revenue for the entire sewer
disposal system and where the revenue could find its
way into the general fund for the city, establishes appellants conteution that the increase places a disproportionate and unfair burden on the builders of new dwelling units in Provo City as compared to the old ones,
in the maintenance of city government and, consequently, it is a discriminatory and constitutionally impermissable tax. The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in
the JV cbcr Basin II ome Builders As:wciation v. Roy
City case should he upheld and the Provo City ordinance
stricken for the same reasons.
Appellants recognize that the fiscal problems which
are confronting our municipalities because of their rapid
growth rate are grave ones and would seek to call for
legislative action, however, the remedy must not come
from the municipalities nor from the courts, but from
the legislature. Provo City must not be allowed to exact
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a discriminatory, unconstitutional, and ultra vires tax
against plaintiffs-appellants.
POINT II
THE LA,VS OF THE STATE OF UTAH DO
NOT PERNIIT PROVO CITY TO EXACT A
SE''rER CONNECTION FEE I,~OR NEW
D'VELLING UNITS.
The real question is whether Provo City has the
authority under State enabling legislation to impose a
$100.00 per dwelling unit sewer connecting tax. The
important section to be considered in this case is Section 10-8-38 of the Utah Code Annotated which reads
as follows:
"Any city or town may, for the purpose of
defraying the cost of construction, reconstruction, maintenance or operation of any sewer
system or sewage treatment plant, make a
remwnable charge for the use thereof. In order
to enforce the collection of any such charge,
the city or town opera ting a water works system may make one charge for the combined
use of water and the services of the sewer system." (emphasis added)
Appellants contend that Provo City has been and is now
charging a monthly sewer service fee to all the users
of its sanitary sewer system. Respondent's brief, on
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page 3, admits this one-time charge is completely separate and distinct from the monthly fee for sewer
service. Thus, hy charging a mandatory connecting fee
for new dwelling units, Provo City has exceeded the
authority found in Section 10-8-38 which limits municipalities to a "reasonable charge for the use thereof"
and "one charge for the combined use of water and
the services of the sewer system."
Any interpretation that the 1971 Legislative
Amendment to Section 10-8-38 providing for mandatory hookup permits municipalities to charge a connecting fee, should be disregarded, since the Provo City
Ordinance was passed August 18, 1970, and since appellant, Villa :Maria, had paid its assessed tax under
protest before the date of that amendment. Even with
the mandatory hookup amendment added, however, the
State staute still authorizes only a reasonable charge
for fhf use and does not authorize an additional fee for
sewer connection to be paid by new residents. The power
to impose a sewer connection tax simply cannot be inf erred from 10-8-38, or any other section of the Utah
Code cited by respondent. The intent of the legislature
is clear.
J<-.urthermore, the city has made no claim that a
major purpose of the so-called connecting fee was to
bring this fee in line with the cost of connecting to the
sewer and inspection and other regulation. All the city
does admit is that the collection of the additional fee is
necessary to improve its sewer system because of

r
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struction of new dwellinQ' units and the bO'J'Owth of the
city. Tims, appellants contend that the tax exacted
here by the city is not a reasonable charge for the use
thereof. A reasonable charge for the use thereof is already made under the other sewer fees which are
charged by Provo City.
u

Respondent again cites "1ssocintcd Jlomcbuildcrs
of the Greater East BalJ, Inc. v. The Citl! of Livermore,
17 Cal. Rptr. 5 :lGG P.2<l 448 (1961), as being controlling in this case. The case mentioned is again distinguishable from the Provo City case at hand, since the California statute invoked in the Livermore case, provided
that the city could exact: "fees, tolls, rates, or other
charges for senices and facilities furnished by it in connection with its sanitation or sewage system." ( p. 451)
By way of comparison, the Utah statute merely provides "for a reasonable charge for the use thereof", and
further, that the city may make "one charge for the
combined use of water and the services of the sewer
system." This one charge is presently made and applied
to all homeowner or dwelling units which presently 1ise
the water and sewer system and thus the additional
charge of $100.00 in ultra vires and beyond the scope
of the enabling legislation.
It is a well recognized principle that the authority
of municipalities to levy a tax must be made clearly
and doubts, if any, as to the powers sought to be exercised must be resolved against the municipality. See
Sanchez v. The City of Santa Fe, 82 N.:M. 322, 481
P.2d 401, (1971) where the court held that:
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"Cities exist only hy virtue of statutory creation and lrnve only such power statutes expressly confer without resort to implication.
Having decided that ordinances in question are
not geared for regulation so as to make it a
police power, it follows that such a fee requirement is in the nature of a tax. The power to
tax is never inferred."
The Burrough of Point Pleasant case reaches the
same result.
"The power to levy licenses for revenue purposes is not inherent in municipal corporations.
The power of taxation is vested in the legislature. l\Iunicipalities, being creatures of the
state, have no power of taxation unless it is
plainly delegated to them." Daniels v. Borough
of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 266.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
"Power of a city tax is derived solely from
legislative enactment and the city has only
such authority as is expressly conferred or
necessarily implied."
The same case held further that:
"In case of any ambiguity or uncertainty u
to authority of a municipality to im~

T
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doubt must he resolved in favor of the taxpayer." 1lloss v. Board of Cornm,issioncrs of
Salt Lake City, l U.2d 60, 261 P.2cl 961,
962 ( 1953).

To summarize under Point No. II then, Provo City
has been and is charging a monthly sewer service fee
to all users of its sanitary sewer system. This is the
reasonable charge for the use of such system contemplated by Section 10-8-38. This statute does not
authorize an additional fee to be paid. Furthermore,
without express legislative intent and express enabling
legislation, municipalities are prevented from exacting
or exercising powers of taxation. This express enabling
legislation is absent in this case.
CONCLUSION
The summary of appellant Villa ·Maria's contention is as follows:
"The so-called hookup fee is really a tax
and as a tax it is an unreasonable and unconstitutional and ultra vires exercise of the powers of the
municipal corporation. The fee charged far exceeds
the cost of the hookup, so it constitutes a one-time tax,
the purpose of which is admittedly to finance the entire
operation of the sewer disposal system in Provo City.
In addition, since the city ordinance is silent as to the
purpose of the fee or as to where the money goes when
collected, it could go into the general fund and be used

r
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to finance community-wide expenses. The Utah
Statute 10-8-38 does not proYide for a hookup charge
of any kind. It provides for a reasonable
char{{e for the use thereof. and the use thereof consist
of the use of the sewer system for which a charge is
presently made. The statute goes on to say that the
city may make one charge for the combined use of
water and services of the sewer sysem, not an additional
charge of $100.00 for hookup and then the charges for
the services and use of the water and sewer system.
Thus, the power to impose a sewer connection tax cannot be inferred from UCA 10-8-38.
Ordinance 248 should be held invalid and plaintiffs
should be awarded judgment against Provo City for
their respective amounts paid thereunder.
Respectfully submitted,

S. REX LE,V"IS, for:
HOW ARD AND LEWIS
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

Attorneys for Appellant,
Yilla Maria

